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Not Just a Walk in the Park: Beach Access
and the Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey
Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club,
370 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 2004).
Jennifer Simon1
On June 3, 2004, the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court ruled that a private beach club
cannot limit vertical or horizontal access to the dry
sand beach, and that the club may not restrict the
public’s right to traverse the dry sand property for
“intermittent recreational purposes.”2 Moreover, the
court held that while a beach club may ask for a fee
from those who wish to use the beach for an extended
period, the club must provide lifeguard services, and
maintain the beach by providing waste receptacles
and picking up trash regularly. Furthermore, the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection must

approve the fee, and it must be comparable to the fees
charged by the municipality for beach tags. The
Appellate Division decision relies upon and extends
the holding of the seminal New Jersey beach access
case, Matthews v. Bayhead3 which extends the public
trust doctrine to apply to dry sand areas of beaches as
well as submerged lands. The Atlantis decision enlarges
the scope of the public trust doctrine to unprecedented
effect, holding that the public has a right not only to
submerged lands, and a right of passage over dry sand,
but must also have recreational access to dry sand
areas even when those areas are held in trust by private
owners. Moreover, the court held that while beach
clubs may charge membership fees, the club cannot
exact more than what it requires to maintain the actual services provided to its members.
See Walk in the Park, page 8

Agencies Prohibited from
Curtailing Summer Spill
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15239 (D. Or. July 29, 2004).
Luke Miller1
The northwest portion of the United States has been
slowly but surely sliding into a head-on collision
between salmon and energy production. With the risk
of losing certain types of salmon stocks forever, conservation groups, tribal representatives, a governor,
and several others have won a significant court battle
to continue summer spill programs on the Columbia
and Snake Rivers. A district court in Oregon recently
enjoined the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) from
curtailing summer spill at The Dalles, Bonneville, Ice
Harbor, and John Day dams in August 2004.

Background
December of 2000 marked the official recognition by
NOAA Fisheries2 that the existence of several salmon
stocks (or evolutionarily significant units (ESUs)) and
their critical habitat were likely to be jeopardized by
the continuing operations of the Federal Columbia
River Power System (FCRPS) – a series of federally
controlled dams producing hydroelectric power.3 In its
2000 Biological Opinion (BiOp), NOAA Fisheries proposed several reasonable and prudent alternatives
(RPA) to avoid jeopardy and adverse modification of
critical habitat. The most significant of these was providing seasonal spill over dams instead of ushering
water through the dam turbines.
The plaintiffs challenged the 2000 BiOp arguing
that the RPAs had not undergone proper Endangered
See Summer Spill, page 5
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“Dolphin-Safe” Tuna
Label Safe for Now
Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15729 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 9, 2004).
Maureen McGowan1
On August 9, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California rejected the
Commerce Department’s efforts to weaken the “dolphin-safe” tuna labeling program. In a scathing decision the court accused the administration of sacrificing science for politics by failing to complete required
scientific studies before determining that there would
be no significant impact to the dolphin population by
changing the tuna labeling standards. The court
found as a matter of law that the final finding of the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) must be set aside,
and the definition of “dolphin-safe” should remain
unchanged.
Background
Yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific (ETP)
often swim below schools of dolphins, and a fishing
technique was developed where purse seine nets were
placed on dolphins in order to catch the tuna. This
method, which involves chasing and netting dolphins
and tuna in mile-long nets, decimated the dolphin
population by killing over seven million animals
since the early 1950s. In response to public outcry
Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act
in 1972, which prohibited U.S. fishing boats from
dropping nets on dolphins, and then imposed the
same standard on foreign imports in the 1980s.
In 1992, Congress passed the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act, creating the “dolphinsafe” label for tuna caught without netting dolphins.
Over the twelve years that the labeling program has
been in effect, dolphin deaths have decreased by 98
percent in the ETP.2 However, by selling only “dolphin-safe” tuna, major U.S. tuna processors effectively banned imports from Mexico and other Latin
American companies with large tuna fleets. Those
nations that lost a huge part of their market due to
the higher standards, as well as other nations fishing
in the ETP, joined together in the International
Dolphin Conservation Program in 1992. Eventually a
binding agreement, the Panama Declaration, was forVolume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

malized, in which the U.S. agreed to ease embargoes
and improve market access for ETP tuna coming
from Mexico and other Latin American fleets.
In 1997, the International Dolphin Conservation
Program Act (IDCPA) authorized the “dolphin-safe”
label to be applied to tuna caught in nets that trap
and release dolphins when shipboard observers found
that no dolphins were harmed or killed, but only if
the Commerce Department concluded after conducting studies that the trap and release process does not
harm depleted dolphin populations. The law required
the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a population
abundance study and three different stress studies in
order to determine whether chase and encirclement
with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse
impact on the dolphins in the ETP.
Initial findings were issued by the Secretary on
May 7, 1999, stating that “there was insufficient evidence that chase and encirclement by the tuna purse
seine industry ‘is having a significant adverse impact’
on depleted dolphin stocks in the ETP.” 3 The
Secretary was prevented from lessening the “dolphinsafe” standard based on his initial findings after environmental groups successfully challenged the findings. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary was
“required to affirmatively find that the fishery either
was or was not having a significant adverse impact,
and could not rely on ‘insufficient evidence’ to
default to a finding of no significant adverse impact .
. . Such an approach would discourage proactive factfinding and research.”4
Preliminary Injunction
In 2002, the Secretary issued his final findings, determining that “the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seines is not having a
significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin
stock in the ETP.”5 Based on these findings the “dolphin-safe” label was redefined to include tuna caught
when dolphins were trapped and released, but not
killed.
In response to the weakening of the “dolphinsafe” standard Earth Island Institute, the Humane
Society of the United States, the ASPCA, Defenders
of Wildlife, and several other environmental groups
filed suit against Donald Evans, the Secretary of
Commerce, to enjoin the administration from changing the “dolphin-safe” standard until the administrative record could be completed. The court found that
a preliminary injunction was appropriate because the
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of the
case, and the public interest weighed in favor of
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

“maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the
case.”6 In the meantime, major U.S. brands (Starkist,
Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee) had already
declared that they will not buy tuna caught by chasing and netting dolphins, regardless of what happens
to the labeling standards.
Summary Judgment under the Administrative
Procedure Act
The Administrative Record was completed in June
2004 and the parties went back to the Northern
District Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. In order to succeed on their motion for summary judgment, Earth Island Institute (EII) would have
to show that the Secretary’s final finding was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law.” The burden would be
on EII to demonstrate that (1) the Secretary’s explanation for his decision runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, (2) the agency relied on facts which
Congress did not intend it to consider, or (3) the
agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem. While there is considerable deference
given to an agency, it is not unlimited and the courts
will conduct a “searching and careful” inquiry into
agency decisions.7
Congressionally Mandated Research
Congress specifically rejected language in the IDCPA
that would have automatically changed the labeling
standards, and instead required the Secretary to conduct several scientific studies to determine the effects
that trap-and-release fishing were having on the
depleted dolphin populations in the ETP before making any decisions. Through “mandatory and direct”
language Congress required the Secretary to carry out
three stress studies: (1) a series of necropsies (comparable to a human autopsy), (2) a review of historical
demographic and biological data, and (3) an experimental chase and encirclement stress study (CHESS).
In prior decisions, the Secretary was expressly
warned that “he could not fail to comply with the
required research and then invoke a ‘lack of stressrelated information to trigger a change’ in the dolphin-safe label standard.”8
Best Available Scientific Evidence
The applicable standard, requiring the Secretary to
evaluate best available scientific evidence, “does not
demand conclusive evidence and is intended to give
‘the benefit of the doubt to the species.’”9 In this case
See Tuna, page 4
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the best available scientific evidence consisted of the
Final Science Report and the reports from two scientific panels. The Secretary adopted an “Organized
Decision Process,” and focused on four different questions when making his final finding: “(1) whether
there have been changes to the ETP ecosystem that
have affected the ability of depleted dolphin stocks to
recover, (2) current direct mortality levels, (3) whether
stress or other indirect effects of the fishery are affecting the ability of dolphin stocks to recover, and (4) the
growth rates of depleted dolphins stocks.”10 On every
question the Secretary tried to spin the relevant data
in support of the position that the depleted dolphin
stocks are not being adversely affected by the fishery;
however the court found that virtually all of the best
available scientific evidence “points towards the fishery having a significant adverse impact.”11
Integrity of the Decision-Making Process
Both the Northern District Court and the Ninth
Circuit held that the Secretary could base his final
findings “[only] on the best available scientific data,
and without deference to trade politics or competing
policy viewpoints.”12 Yet the evidence indicated that
the Secretary was persuaded by political and diplomatic concerns unrelated to the scientific data, particularly the influences of the U.S. Department of
State and Mexico. The court stated that it was “convinced that the Secretary’s decision-making process
was infected by the very policy considerations that
Congress had directed should not be considered.”13
Conclusion
In his 24 years on the bench, the judge
claimed he had “[never] reviewed a
record of agency action that contained
such a compelling portrait of political
meddling.” 14 The best scientific evidence “indicates that (1) dolphin
stocks are still severely depleted and
are not recovering despite extremely
low reported mortality rates, (2) that
their recovery is being risked or appreciably delayed, (3) that changes to the
ecosystem are unlikely to explain this
phenomena, and (4) that indirect
effects from the fishery can plausibly
account for the lack of recovery.”15 In
spite of the evidence, the Secretary
made a final finding that the “intentional deployment on or encirclement
of dolphins with purse seine nets is not
Page 4

having a significant adverse effect on any depleted
dolphin stock in the ETP.”16 Earth Island Institute
successfully demonstrated that the Secretary’s
offered explanation for its decision ran counter to the
evidence before the agency and that the agency relied
on facts which Congress did not intend it to consider.
Therefore, for now, the “dolphin-safe” labeling standard will remain as it has been for the past twelve
years.
Endnotes
1. Maureen is a third-year law student at the
University of Georgia School of Law.
2. Mark J. Palmer, Earth Island Sues Again to Save
Dolphins, EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL, June 22, 2003,
at 19.
3. Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15729 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2004).
4. Id. at *11.
5. Id. at *15.
6. Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 256 F.Supp.2d 1064,
1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
7. Earth Island Institute, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15729 at *21.
8. Id. at *24.
9. Id. at *95.
10. Id. at *36-37.
11. Id. at *38.
12. Id. at *77.
13. Id. at *92.
14. Id. at *78.
15. Id. at *95-96.
16. Id. at *98.

Photograph of dolphins caught in early tuna purse seining operations courtesy of NOAA Fisheries
Collection
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Summer Spill, from page 1

Species Act (ESA) review and were not reasonably
certain to occur. On May 7, 2003, the court agreed and
remanded the BiOp to NOAA Fisheries for consultation and review. 4 NOAA Fisheries was required to
release a revised BiOp on August 31, 2004.5
Before the revised BiOp was issued, the Corps
and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) submitted amendments to their operating plans in an
effort to reduce the number of required spill days for
their facilities. The Corps and BPA offered to mitigate by releasing additional water from other facilities to compensate for the potential loss of water.
NOAA Fisheries signed off on the plan and, on July 6,
2004, the Corps issued a “statement of decision”
(SOD) committing itself to ending summer spill
operations earlier than in previous years. On July 9,
2004, the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief arguing that
NOAA Fisheries and the Corps illegally modified the
summer spill program.
In general, to secure a preliminary injunction a
party must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or show
that serious questions going to the merits were raised
and the balance of hardships tips in their direction.6
Under the ESA, however, preliminary injunctions are
issued under a lower threshold than traditional injunctions. A party need only show that a violation of the
ESA is at least likely to occur in the future.7
The court found two fundamental flaws in the
defendant’s case. First, NOAA Fisheries, as mentioned above, indicated in the year 2000 that maintaining a certain number of spill days would be necessary to help protect salmon stocks. Yet now NOAA
Fisheries claimed that a shorter spill cycle would not
impair the fish population. NOAA argued that the
summer spill program could be curtailed without
harming salmon stocks because of a new mitigation
measure proposed by the Corps and BPA - the infusion of 100,000 acre-feet of water from Brownlee
reservoir. The district court judge found this reasoning to be arbitrary and capricious because a large
portion of the water from the reservoir would not be
new water. This secondary reservoir was already providing 77,000 acre-feet. The mitigation measure,
therefore, would only provide a gain of 23,000 acrefeet, not 100,000 acre-feet, so NOAA Fisheries had
overestimated the amount of new water available to
offset reducing the number of spill days.
The second defect highlighted by the court was
the agency’s assumption regarding how the release of
this extra water from the reservoir would occur.
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

NOAA Fisheries assumed the water would be
released over a 21-day continuous period with a uniform flow. The court determined, however, that the
company in control of the reservoir was under no
contractual obligation to release water at a continual
flow, and in fact previous year data showed a very
large fluctuation in release amounts dependent on
regional energy needs. The court concluded that
these flawed assumptions “undercut[ ] any confidence in the conclusions reached by the agency
regarding the impact on the fish.”7
Conclusion
The court held that NOAA Fisheries’ decision to curtail the summer spill program was arbitrary and
capricious. The plaintiffs easily made the requisite
showing of harm, as NOAA Fisheries’ own documents reveal that diminished spill days would be
seriously detrimental to the survival of the salmon
stocks. The district court ruled that “spill operations
as contemplated by the 2000 BiOp to avoid jeopardy
shall continue this summer as they have in past summers” and enjoined the Corps from curtailing summer spill operations at The Dalles, Bonneville, Ice
Harbor, and John Day dams.9
Endnotes
1. Luke is a third-year law student at the University of
Mississippi School of Law.
2. NOAA Fisheries is also known as the National
Marine Fisheries Service.
3. B o n n e v i l l e Po w e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Fe d e r a l
Columbia River Power System brochure, available at
http://www.bpa.gov/power/pg/fcrps_brochure_17x11.pdf .
4. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
254 F.Supp 2d 1196 (D. Or. May 7, 2003).
5. The agency issued its new draft BiOp on September
9, 2004. Specific actions proposed by NOAA
Fisheries to avoid jeopardy include new improvements to hydro dams, expanded control of fish-eating predators, continued implementation of habitat
improvements, and continued funding of critical
hatchery programs. Fact Sheet, NOAA Fisheries,
Draft FCRPS BiOp Highlights (September 9, 2004)
available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/.
6. Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340
F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003).
7. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d
1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994).
8. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, v. NMFS, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
15239 at *12 (D. Or. July 29, 2004).
9. Id. at *15.
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Framework Adjustment 14 Does Not
Violate Magnuson-Stevens Act
Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21 (1st
Cir. 2004).

judgment and an appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit ensued.

T. B. Boardman Jr., J.D.1

Mootness
On March 1, 2003, while CLF’s appeal was pending,
Framework 14 was superseded by Framework 15. As a
result, the defendants contended that the expiration
of Framework 14 rendered the case moot. The First
Circuit noted that for the defendant to prevail on the
mootness claim it bore a “heavy” burden in demonstrating that the allegedly wrong behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.2
NMFS simply could not carry this burden since
Framework 15’s only modification to Framework 14
was an increase in the limits on the amount of scallops
that could be held on board a fishing vessel. Therefore,
the court questioned whether the alleged wrongs had
already recurred. Moreover, even though Framework
15 was promulgated in a procedurally proper manner
the challenge was not moot because NMFS’s preceding procedural deficiencies were capable of repetition.
As a result, the court held that the case was not moot.

Introduction
In the latest challenge to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), the First Circuit Court of
Appeals denied an appeal by the Conservation Law
Foundation and Oceana (together, CLF) concerning
a 2001 framework adjustment to the Atlantic Sea
Scallop Fishery Management Plan. CLF asserted that
the NMFS’s failure to close four sensitive scalloping
areas was arbitrary and capricious and its failure to
provide a notice and comment period for the framework adjustment violated the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
The First Circuit denied CLF’s claims and also
denied the agency’s assertion that the case was moot.
Background
Scallops are benthic inhabitants that are typically
fished by dredging, a method that is detrimental to
the seabed habitat. NMFS manages scalloping in the
Atlantic coastal waters through the Atlantic Sea
Scallop Fishery Management Plan. For the 2001 and
2002 fishing years, NMFS adjusted the Plan with
Framework 14 pursuant to its authorization under
the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). Framework 14 closed approximately 5,000 square nautical
miles to scallop fishing. Additionally, it maintained
restrictions on days at sea, catch and mesh sizes, and
limited seasonal access to sensitive areas.
However, the southeast part of Georges Bank, the
Great South Channel, the New York Bright, and
Delmarva, all composed of gravel and sandy bottoms
and particularly vulnerable to harm from dredging,
remained open to scalloping. As a result, the CLF
complained that NMFS failed to give habitat protection and the reduction of groundfish bycatch ample
consideration. The CLF challenged NMFS’s
Framework 14 both substantively, as arbitrary and
capricious, and procedurally, for failing to provide
the minimum fifteen days for public comment
required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act in the United
States District Court of Massachusetts. The District
Court granted the agency’s motion for summary
Page 6

Substantive Challenge
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act, agency action can only
be upset by the court if the action is arbitrary or
capricious. CLF contended that NMFS’s failure to
close scallop harvesting in the four areas was arbitrary and capricious because it failed its duty to minimize, “to the extent practicable”: 1) adverse effects
on essential fish habitat, and 2) bycatch.3
According to CLF, NMFS “ignored relevant factors” that should have been considered and failed to
“articulate a rational basis” for declining to close the
four areas.4 However, the Court found that NMFS is
only required to minimize adverse effects and bycatch
“to the extent practicable,” not to implement virtually any measure to address essential fish habitat and
bycatch concerns, as the CLF seemed to require. As a
result, the CLF’s arguments were flawed because
they did not account for the existing restrictions on
scallop fishing imposed by Framework 14, which
statutorily satisfied NMFS’s obligations. The court
held that the plaintiffs did not show that NMFS acted
irrationally in implementing Framework 14 without
imposing additional closures.5
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

Procedural Challenge
CLF’s final attack was on NMFS’s failure to provide
a public comment period in developing Framework
14. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires notice and
comment for regulations that modify or amend a
fishery management plan.6 The CLF equated the
framework adjustment to
an amendment or
modification and
therefore asserted that notice
and comment
was required.
However, the
First Circuit
affirmed the
District Court’s
finding that a
framework
adjustment is
distinguishable from an
amendment
or a modification and therefore is not subject to notice and
comment.
The court pointed to section 1855(f) to explain
such a distinction. Section 1855(f) clearly makes a
distinction between “regulations promulgated by the
Secretary” and “actions that are taken by the
Secretary under regulations which implement a fishery management plan.”7 The Court recognized that
“a framework adjustment such as Framework 14 was
implemented through an action of the Secretary after
a finding by the Council that a formal regulation was
neither necessary nor appropriate.”8 As a result, the
Court held that the District Court properly classified
Framework 14 as an action, not a regulation, and
found that it was not subject to notice and comment.
In the alternative, CLF alleged procedural harm
under the Administrative Procedure Act because
NMFS failed to demonstrate good cause for waiving
notice and comment. The First Circuit quickly dismissed this claim by first noting that fourteen public
meetings, a supplemental environmental impact
statement, CLF’s submission of written and oral
comment prior to and during Council meetings, and
NMFS’s responses to CLF’s concerns, demonstrated
that CLF was not ignored. Moreover, the court found
that CLF “failed to identify any comment that they
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

were prevented from making because of this alleged
procedural defect that would have made a difference
in the result.”9 Accordingly, even
if CLF’s allegations were
true, the omission of a
formal public comment
period would be mere
harmless error because the omission of
a formal public comment period would
have no bearing on the
decision reached by
NMFS.
Conclusion
A challenge to a framework adjustment that
has been superceded will
be considered moot only
if under the new framework the alleged wrongs will
not recur. While an amendment or
modification to a fishery management plan requires a notice and comment period under the MagnusonStevens Act, a framework adjustment, such
as Framework 14, is distinguishable and does not
require such attention. Pursuant to the MagnusonStevens Act, an agency is not required to implement
every measure that would minimize the adverse
effects to essential fish habitats. Instead, it has an
obligation to implement actions only to the extent
practicable.

Endnotes
1. Terrell B. Boardman Jr. is a graduate of Roger
Williams School of Law, Bristol, Rhode Island, and
is currently pursuing a Masters in Marine Affairs
at the University of Rhode Island.
2. Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21,
24 (1st Cir. 2004).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1683 (2004).
4. Conservation Law Foundation, 360 F.3d at 28.
5. Id.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (2004).
7. Id. § 1855(f).
8. Conservation Law Foundation, 360 F.3d at 29 (internal quotations omitted).
9. Id.
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New Jersey Beaches and the Problem of Beach Access
The State of New Jersey is host to nearly 130 miles of
coastline bordering the Atlantic Ocean. The New
Jersey shore provides a haven for tourists, vacationers,
surfers and other water recreationists, nature lovers,
and people who simply want to spend the day at the
beach. In addition to providing pleasure, the New
Jersey beaches also lure in a substantial supply of consumers that support a wide array of coastal businesses
including restaurants, real estate agencies, bars, and
general retailers. Moreover, New Jersey beaches are
close enough to several large metropolitan areas (New
York City, Philadelphia, Newark and their suburbs)
that it is common for beachgoers to come just for the
day, or to commute from less expensive areas slightly
farther inland.
In the last century, beachfront property has
become an increasingly valuable commodity as undeveloped property becomes more and more scarce.
Many beaches along New Jersey’s coast are now bordered by a virtual wall of hotels and homes on adjacent
lots of land. In order to get to the beach itself, the public is forced to either traverse private property, or find a
municipally sanctioned access point. To add to the difficulty, many public access points are hidden between
private lots of land and it is not uncommon for
landowners to obscure or obstruct the entry point, or
even to place “private property” signs in such a way as
to convince the public that there is no access available
at all at the site. As a result, the public is often forced to
circumnavigate these blocked-off areas to obtain access
which may involve going miles out of their way. In the
alternative, municipalities have requested landowners
to provide easements across their properties and have
even gone so far as to require an easement before granting building or zoning permits.4 While it is well settled
that the public may use lands located below the tide
lines, it is less clear whether the public can also make
use of the beach, and, if so, where the public beach
ends and private property begins, given that tidewashed beaches are inherently changing pieces of
land. Additionally, even when a beach area is called
“public,” municipalities or other private entities frequently charge for permits that allow beachgoers to do
more than simply pass through the beach area.
Therefore, the issues are threefold:
(1) whether the public has an inherent right to use
the beach;
(2) if the public does have a right to use the shore,
whether the public has a right to convenient
physical access; and
Page 8

(3) whether the government or a private owner has
a right to regulate access to the beach by
requiring that beachgoers obtain permits for a
fee.
The issues raised by the problem of beach access
require a review of the public trust doctrine, which
provides that lands held in trust for public use must
not be restricted for private use, in light of the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment, which requires that
private property owners be compensated if their property rights have been unjustly infringed upon by the
government. Customary law, dating back to the time
of Justinian, has held that “everyone could use the
seashore ‘to dry his nets there, and haul them from the
sea . . .’”5 However, while it is clear that submerged
lands fall under the scope of the public trust doctrine,
it is less clear whether areas that are occasionally submerged by the tides are protected.6
Thus, while the public has an inherent right to
the use of tidal areas, there is no public right to private property. If the dry sand beaches which lie
between the uplands and the water can be held by
private owners who may by all rights exclude the
public, the public may have no physical route to
gain access to the waters which would essentially
create a cordon of exclusive beaches. Since the public trust doctrine clearly disallows this complete
exclusion of the public, it seems that private owners
must allow the public to gain access to the beach
despite their property rights. However, the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution
explicitly provides that private property “shall [not]
be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Inversely then, while the public may have a right to
use the beach, the right of a property owner to
exclude the public from his property could serve to
prevent the public from traversing his property to
gain access to the beach.
The Public Trust Doctrine in New Jersey
New Jersey has long held that submerged lands are
held in trust by the state for the public benefit and
use. In 1870, the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals held that “all navigable waters within the
territorial limits of the State, and the soil under such
waters, belong in actual propriety to the public.” 7
Prior to the upsurge of beachfront developments and
attendance, there was little need for municipal maintenance or supervision of the beaches, and thus,
beaches were free.8 However, as the tourist population
increased and the need for maintenance, service, and
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safety facilities increased, municipalities began
charging fees for beach access.9
Challenges to mandatory municipal fees and permits began almost immediately after the requirements took effect. In 1954, the New Jersey Superior
Court held that while municipalities may charge a fee
for beach access, “an oceanfront municipality may not
absolutely exclude non-residents from the use of its
dedicated beach, including, of course, land seaward of
the mean high water mark.”10 In 1972, the New Jersey
Supreme Court further held that “while a municipality may validly charge reasonable fees for the use of
their beaches, they may not discriminate in any
respect between their residents and non-residents”11
thus requiring that the same fee apply to both residents and non-residents. The Court reasoned that
municipal actions with discriminatory effect are
unconstitutional on land held in trust for the public,
which extended to municipally owned dry sand flanking the high water mark.12
Twelve years later, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in its seminal Matthews opinion, opined that
quasi-municipal property owners that provide the
beach services and maintenance ordinarily provided
by a municipality may not exclude the public from
the dry sand area of the beach: “To say that the public
trust doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean
and to use the foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the public of a feasible access route
would seriously impinge upon, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of public trust doctrine.”13 Moreover,
the court held that the public’s right to municipally
owned dry sand “is not limited to passage . . . [because]
[r]easonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea
cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry
sand area is also allowed.”14 Therefore, the court held
that the public trust doctrine must extend to provide
for “public access to and use of privately-owned
upland sand areas as reasonably necessary”15 subject
to an accommodation of the needs of the owner.
However, because the facts of the Matthews case pertained to the exclusivity claims of a quasi-municipal
landowner, the court stopped short of discussing the
property rights of non-municipal private land owners.
Factual and Procedural Background of Atlantis Beach
Club
The Atlantis Beach Club owns beachfront property in
Lower Township, New Jersey in an area known as
Diamond beach. Atlantis’ property consists of dunes,
dry sand beach, and ocean floor. At high tide, a large
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portion of the property is entirely submerged. To the
north and south of Atlantis’ property are La Vida del
Mar and La Quinta Del Mar, condominium and hotel
complexes. SeaPointe Village, another hotel and condominium complex, lies north of La Vida del Mar,
and provides lifeguard services, a public restroom,
outdoor showers, and parking facilities. With the
approval of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s Division of Coastal Resources,
Seapointe sells daily, weekly, and seasonal beach
tags.16 Neither of the resort complexes that directly
border Atlantis restrict or limit access to their beach
properties.
In 1996, Atlantis began to limit access to its property by mandating a minimum seasonal “membership
rate” of $300.00 for a family of six. By 2002, Atlantis
had significantly augmented its rates, increasing the
minimum membership fee to $700.00 for a family of
eight, with an available lifetime membership priced
at $10,000.00. Atlantis’ owners certify that the club
provides “security, maintenance, and lifeguard services, together with some recreational activities.”17
Atlantis does not provide showers, restroom facilities,
refreshments, beach chairs or other amenities to its
members, and the property boasts only two permanent structures: a boardwalk which runs between the
adjacent condominium complexes, and a bulkhead.
Above the bulkhead, Atlantis has posted a sign
which reads: “Free Public Access Ends Here/
M e m b e r s h i p Av a i l a b l e a t G a t e . ” 1 8 I n 2 0 0 3 ,
Atlantis sent out a letter to its current membership
and to residents in the surrounding area soliciting
membership fees with the adage, “[t]he price of
exclusivity is not cheap.” 19 During the summer of
2003, Atlantis lifeguards were seen patrolling the
property with bullhorns announcing that “people
who were sitting on the wet sand area (the foreshore)
were trespassing and robbing members of Atlantis’
services.”20 If residents of the condominium complexes adjacent to Atlantis cannot cross over Atlantis’
beach front property to gain access to the public
beaches on either side, they must circumnavigate
Atlantis’ property by walking up to the street and
around, which involves nearly half of a mile of additional travel. Atlantis responded by posting an addition to its rules and regulations which reads,
“Anyone Attempting to Use, Enter upon or Cross over
Club Property for Any Reason Without Club
Permission or Who Is Not in Possession of a Valid Tag
and Authorized to Use Such Tag Will Be Subject to
See Walk in the Park, page 10
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Prosecution, Civil and or Criminal to the Fullest
Extent Permitted by Law Including All Costs and
Legal Fees Incurred by the Club.”21
Subsequently, in July 2002, Atlantis filed an Order
to Show Cause and Verified Complaint against a resident of one of the adjacent condominium complexes
and his “class of persons” seeking to enjoin them from
trespassing on Atlantis property, and seeking affirmation of its claim that it is not required to provide free
passage across its property to anyone not a member of
the Club. In response, the Raleigh Avenue Beach
Association, whose membership consists of residents
of a street bordering Atlantis’ property filed a complaint against Atlantis and the State of New Jersey
requesting a declaration that they are entitled to
access to the wet sand area of Atlantis’ property without reserve, and to a “sufficient amount of dry sand
above the mean high water line,” 2 2 and that
Atlantis had violated the public trust doctrine.
In an order issued by the Chancery
Division in September 2002, the court held
that the “public trust doctrine
‘applied’ to Atlantis’s property,”
but that public access to the dry
sand area of the beach was limited to a narrow three-foot strip
just above the high water mark,
and that vertical access should be
provided “insofar as practical” withi n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e D E P.
Moreover, the court held that
Atlantis was entitled to charge a
“commercially reasonable fee” for
the use of its property subject to
the Club’s provision of lifeguards
and other services and equipment.
Joined by the resident association, the State of
New Jersey filed a notice of Appeal in December 2003.
The state’s appeal was joined by a number of additional citizen’s groups who filed a combined amicus
brief. Prior to the appellate hearing, the Appellate
Division granted a stay on the imposition of Atlantis’
2004 beach fees, and an order to return any beach fees
collected after January 2004. Atlantis asserts that the
Chancery Court correctly held that the public trust
applies to its property and that the access provided for
in that opinion satisfies the public access needs under
the doctrine. The appellant state and citizen groups
argued that the access provided for in the
Chancery Court’s opinion still violated the public
t r u s t d o c t r i n e , a n d m o r e o v e r, t h a t t h e f e e s
required by Atlantis were wholly unreasonable.
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The Appellate Division Reverses, Modifies and
Remands
The Appellate Division first reversed the Chancery
Court to the extent that the lower court’s opinion limited horizontal and vertical access to Atlantis’ property and to the dry sand for sporadic recreational use.
The Court then modified the portion of the lower
court’s opinion that called for a “commercially reasonable fee” and remanded for an assessment of what
constitutes a reasonable access fee.
The court began with a detailed historical review
of the public trust doctrine citing Borough of Avon and
Matthews. The court took particular notice of the
Matthews court’s finding that “enjoyment of rights in
the foreshore is inseparable from use of dry sand
beaches”23 and that the beachgoers’ right to the dry
sands above the high water mark must incorporate
not only passage across those lands, but that “the
complete pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods of rest and
relaxation beyond the water’s edge.”24
Applying the Matthews finding
that allows public use of privately held dry sand areas,
“subject to an accommodation
of the interests of the owner,”
the court assessed the particular benefits of membership
with the beach club that would
require the protection of exclusive rights. The
court held that because exclusivity “is not a
valid reason for limiting use or access, . . .
[the public’s] intermittent or recreational
use of the upland sand [would not] interfere with or otherwise prevent [Atlantis] from
servicing its members.” 25 However, when Atlantis
asserted that its membership benefits also will
include access to showers and the sale of refreshments, the court agreed that Atlantis may limit access
to those services to its exclusive membership. Thus,
the court held that the public may traverse across
Atlantis’ dry sand beaches both vertically to gain
access to the beach from the upland areas, and horizontally to travel between the public beaches bordering the Club property.
Next, the court reviewed the reasonableness of
Atlantis’ membership fees. Relying on its affirmation
of the Chancery Court holding that the public trust
doctrine does apply to Atlantis’ property, the court
reasoned that Atlantis has essentially taken on the
burden of holding its parcel of beach front property
in trust for the public use. Thus, while Atlantis is a
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private organization that may not normally be subject to judicial limitations on its business practices
and membership fees, the Club is effectively acting as
a trustee of public lands and is thus subject to limits
on the profitability of its services. Citing N.J.A.C.
7:7E-8.11(b)4’s prohibition on fees, the court held
that Atlantis may not exact a greater fee than what is
reasonably necessary to cover the costs of maintenance and administration of services. The court did
not hazard an estimate of Atlantis’ maintenance and
administration costs, instead remanding the determination of what constitutes a reasonable membership
fee to the Chancery Court for review in light of the
present findings. At present, the Atlantis Beach Club
website still reflects its original $700.00 seasonal and
$15,000.00 lifetime membership fees.26
Conclusion: The Effect of the Atlantis Beach Club
Decision
The holding of the Appellate Division in the Atlantis
case provides a significant legal precedent to support
advocates of beach access throughout the state of
New Jersey. This is especially vital as undeveloped
shore front land becomes more and more scarce.
However, it is unlikely that the decision of the
Appellate Division will go unchallenged. The owner
of Atlantis has threatened to file an appeal to the
State Supreme Court, arguing that DEP-approved
fees charged at SeaPointe would barely cover his
property taxes notwithstanding the maintenance and
service costs associated with the Club. In contrast,
environmentalists and citizens’ advocacy organizations hail the ruling as a solid blow against private
owners that seek to exclude the public from wide
swathes of beach area, and against beach clubs which
attempt to extort enormous sums of money for the
use of what, for all practical purposes, is property
held for the public benefit.
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Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Narrow
Reading of SWANCC
United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
Lauren Cozzolino1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently reaffirmed that a hydrological connection to navigable water is enough to invoke federal jurisdiction and the protection of the Clean
Water Act.
Background
Defendants John and Judith Rapanos own various
parcels of land in Bay, Midland, and Saginaw
Counties in Michigan. In December 1988, John
Rapanos asked the state of Michigan to inspect one of
his parcels of land known as the Salzburg site.
Following the inspection, state representatives
informed Rapanos that the site was probably a wetland regulated by the Clean Water Act.
Mr. Rapanos then hired a consultant to prepare a
report detailing the wetlands on the Salzburg site.
This consultant, Dr. Goff, concluded that there were
between 48 and 58 acres of wetlands on the site and
presented his findings to Mr. Rapanos. Upset by Dr.
Goff ’s findings, Mr. Rapanos ordered Dr. Goff to
destroy his report and all references to Mr. Rapanos
in Dr. Goff ’s files. Dr. Goff refused to do so and Mr.
Rapanos threatened to “destroy” Dr. Goff if he did
not comply claiming that he would bulldoze the site
himself regardless of Goff ’s findings. 2 In April of
1989, workers began leveling ground, clearing brush,
removing stumps, moving dirt and dumping sand to
cover most of the wetland vegetation. In August 1989,
the state attempted to inspect the site but was denied
access. A few months later, authorities returned,
armed with a search warrant.
In 1991, a state representative returned to the
Salzburg site and noticed that the site had been
“tiled” to drain subsurface water. Shortly thereafter,
an administrative compliance order was issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requiring
Rapanos to immediately cease his filling of the
Salzburg site. Mr. Rapanos refused to comply with
the order. The EPA referred the matter to the
Department of Justice and the Rapanoses were
charged, both criminally and civilly, with illegally
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discharging fill material into protected wetlands at
this site and two others from 1988 to 1997.
In the criminal case, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan originally
entered judgment in favor of the United States. John
Rapanos was sentenced to three years probation and a
$185,000 fine. The Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction and Rapanos appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, contending that the wetlands in question were
not subject to federal jurisdiction and the permitting
requirements of the Clean Water Act. The Supreme
Court vacated the conviction in light of the Court’s
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).3 The case
was remanded to the district court for further consideration. Although the district court set aside the conviction, on appeal the Sixth Circuit reinstated
Rapanos’ conviction basing jurisdiction on other provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
The civil case proceeded simultaneously with the
criminal case. On the civil side, in March 2000, the
district court concluded that the defendants had
filled 54 acres of protected wetlands. The defendants
appealed, again arguing that these wetlands fell outside the regulatory authority of the Corps. This article summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in the
civil appeal.
The Clean Water Act
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”). Section 404 of this statute requires
landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before
discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to
navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. The
CWA applies only to “waters of the United States.”4
Waters of the United States have been broadly
defined to include “all waters that could be used in
interstate commerce and all interstate lakes, rivers,
streams, wetlands, sloughs, wet meadows, natural
ponds, etc.”5 Thus, only wetlands that have a connection to navigable waters or interstate commerce are
protected by the § 404 permitting requirements of the
Clean Water Act. Courts have struggled for years to
determine how much connection to navigable waters
or interstate commerce is necessary to invoke the protection of the CWA.
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The United States Supreme Court has tried to
clarify the scope of federal authority to regulate discharges of fill materials into wetlands. It is well established that wetlands “adjacent to” traditional navigable waters or their tributaries are within the jurisdic-
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tion of the CWA.6 However, determining which wetlands are considered “adjacent to” navigable water
has proven difficult to determine. In U.S. v. Riverside
Bayview Homes,7 the Court construed the coverage of
the CWA broadly. The Court found that wetlands
need not be adjacent to navigable water so long as
water from the wetlands is connected to the navigable
water. In SWANCC, the Supreme Court qualified its
holding in Riverside Bayview stating that there must
be a “significant nexus” between the wetlands and the
navigable water.8
In light of these two decisions, there is no requirement that the wetlands directly abut the navigable
water. What is required for CWA jurisdiction over
“adjacent waters” is a significant nexus between the
wetlands and navigable waters. On appeal to the
Sixth Circuit, Rapanos argued that the district court
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erred when it held that the filled wetlands on his
property were “adjacent” to navigable water and
within the jurisdiction of the CWA. The Sixth Circuit
was not persuaded by Rapanos’ argument and held
that a hydrological connection satisfies the SWANCC
“significant nexus” test. Using
reasoning similar to that in
Riverside Bayview, the Sixth
Circuit held that wetlands that
are hydrologically connected
to navigable waters may bring
pollution to those navigable
waters and result in disastrous
effects on the habitat and food
chain of the native aquatic
species. Therefore, federal
jurisdiction is appropriate.
Conclusion
In sum, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the district court’s
judgment against Rapanos
despite the fact that the wetlands were not directly next to
a navigable water. The court
held that a hydrological connection to a navigable water is
enough to invoke federal jurisdiction. Therefore, Rapanos’
filling of the wetlands on his
property was in violation of
the § 404 permitting requirements of the CWA.

Endnotes
1. Lauren is a third-year law student at the University
of Connecticut School of Law.
2. U.S. v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004).
3. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In SWANCC, the Supreme
Court held that the Corps had exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act by adopting its
“migratory bird rule” which extended the definition of “waters of the U.S.” to isolated waters used
as habitat by migratory birds and endangered
species.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2004).
5. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2004).
6. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 635.
7. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
8. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159.
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NMFS Properly Classified Hawaiian
Longline Fishery
Kohola v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 314
F.Supp.2d 1029 (D. Haw. 2004).
Daniel Park1
On April 13, 2004, the United States District Court
for the District of Hawai’i ruled that the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS): (1) did not err
when classifying the Hawaiian Longline Fishery as a
Category III fishery for 2003 and (2) possessed the
discretion to consider the reliability of the existing
scientific data in making its 2003 classification decision. The district court based its ruling on the language of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), as well as NMFS’s own regulations.
Background
The MMPA, in order to regulate the “taking” of
marine mammals by commercial fishing fleets,
requires NMFS to classify commercial fisheries under
one of three categories and to reexamine the classifications once every year.2 A Category I fishery is a commercial fishery with frequent incidental mortality and
serious injury of marine mammals. A Category II fishery has occasional incidental mortality and serious
injury of marine mammals. Commercial fisheries
with a remote likelihood of or no known incidental
mortality or serious injury of marine mammals are
classified as Category III. Pursuant to the MMPA,
Category I and II fisheries must satisfy several additional regulatory requirements, including displaying
certificates of authorization, while Category III fisheries are largely unregulated.
The present dispute involves the “false killer
whale” and Hawai’i’s commercial longline fishery.
Since 1994, NMFS has classified the Hawai’i longline fishery as a Category III fishery. Recent scientific data, though, indicates that every year approximately four to nine false killer whales are caught in
longlines used to catch tuna and swordfish. Despite
recommendations from the Pacific Scientific Review
Group to change the longline fishery’s classification
to either Category I or II, NMFS left the classification at Category III in 2003.
The plaintiffs Hui Malama I Kohola, Center for
Biological Diversity and Turtle Island Restoration
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Network argued that NMFS’s refusal to change the
classification was illegal. Relying on the annual
mortality rate of false killer whales, the plaintiffs
contended that catching even one false killer whale
per year put the longline fishery into Category I.
However, the uncertainty of scientific data on the
population of false killer whales in the relevant area
presented a major complication to the plaintiffs’
case. Although a 1990 survey estimated a minimum
population size of 83 false killer whales, both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that this data was inadequate because areas around the Northwest Hawaiian
Islands and beyond twenty-five nautical miles from
the main islands were not surveyed and estimates
were uncorrected for the proportion of diving animals missed during the aerial survey.
The Court’s Analysis
In determining that NMFS’s 2003 classification
decision was not arbitrary and capricious, the district court analyzed several arguments raised by
plaintiffs to support their position that the Hawai’i
longline fishery should be classified as Category I.
First, the plaintiffs argued that the wording of
NMFS’s regulation and its definition of Category I
left no room for any other classification. The Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument.
NMFS regulations define a Category 1 fishery as:
a commercial fishery determined by the
Assistant Administrator to have frequent incidental mortality and serious
injury of marine mammals. A commercial fishery that frequently causes mortality or serious injury of marine mammals is one that is by itself responsible
for the annual removal of 50 percent or
more of any stock’s potential biological
removal level.3
The Court ruled that the definition of a Category 1
fishery must be read in conjunction with the definitions of Category II and III fisheries. Both the
Category II and III definitions state that in the
absence of reliable information, NMFS should evaluate other factors in determining the frequency of
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incidental mortality or serious injury. The plaintiffs
argued that the absence of this clause requires NMFS
to classify the longline fishery as a Category 1,
because the agency cannot look to other factors. The
Court, however, determined that the exclusion of the
“in the absence of reliable information” clause from
the Category I regulatory definition and the corresponding inclusion in Categories II and III could
imply that a Category I classification requires the
availability of reliable data. Under that interpretation, because reliable data was not available, NMFS
could not classify the longline fishery as Category 1
and could look to other factors when considering
other classifications. Since NMFS’s interpretation of
its own regulations was not plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation, the Court concluded
that NMFS’s interpretation was controlling.
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that NMFS failed
to consider the “best available scientific evidence”
in classifying the longline fishery. The Court also
rejected this argument because NMFS took into
account stock assessment reports, the known limitations of the reliability of the existing data, and the
fact that new data would be used for the 2004 classification. Therefore, the Court held that there was

sufficient evidence in the record to allow NMFS to
make its eventual decision. The Court also noted
that the primary relief sought by the plaintiffs
would soon be moot because the 2004 classification
decision will be based on new false killer whale population data and will likely result in a reclassification of Hawai’i’s longline fishery.
Conclusion
Based on this analysis, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Hawai’i denied the plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment and granted the defendants’
and intervenor’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs were not entitled to an order
requiring NMFS to reclassify the longline fishery.

Endnotes
1. Dan is a second-year law student at the University
of Hawai’i School of Law.
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(c)(1)(C) (2004). “Taking” means
to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.
Id. § 1362(13).
3. 50 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2004).

Photograph of false killer whale courtesy of NOAA, taken off the bow of the NOAA ship, Gordon Gunter

Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

Page 15

Decision Not to List Cook Inlet
Beluga Whales as Endangered Upheld
Alaska Center for Env’t v. Rue, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 98
(Alaska July 30, 2004).
Danny Davis1
In July 2004, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Alaska Fish and Game Commissioner
not to list the Cook Inlet beluga whale as endangered
under Alaska’s Endangered Species Act. The Court,
however, also held that the commissioner used a
wrong legal standard in deciding that the whales are
not a distinct subspecies.

Beluga whale graphic from ©Nova Development Corp.

Background
In May 2000, responding to a request from the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed the Cook Inlet beluga whale as a depleted stock because the beluga’s
numbers had fallen below the optimum sustainable
population level. In the mid-1980’s the Cook Inlet
belugas numbered over one thousand but by 1998
had declined to around 350, primarily due to overharvesting. Various groups petitioned NMFS to list the
belugas as an endangered species under the federal
Endangered Species Act.2 In June 2000, NMFS determined that the cause of the beluga’s decline was overharvesting and that the beluga was in no danger of
extinction. NMFS believed that restricting the harvesting of belugas would allow the population to
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recover. A suit was brought in federal district court
challenging the decision not to list the belugas as
endangered. The court dismissed the case, stating that
NMFS acted within the scope of its legal authority.
While the federal ESA process was proceeding,
the Alaska Center for the Environment (ACE),
along with other groups, petitioned Alaska’s Fish
and Game commissioner to list the Cook Inlet beluga whales as an endangered species under Alaska’s
Endangered Species Act. In July 2000, the commissioner issued a decision declining to list the belugas
as an endangered species because the belugas were
not threatened by extinction. The commissioner
also determined that the
belugas are not a “species
or subspecies” within the
meaning of the Act. ACE
filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
claiming the commissioner erred in determining
that the belugas are not
threatened and not a
“species or subspecies.”
The Alaska Superior
Court affirmed the commissioner’s decision. Although the court questioned the subspecies
decision, the court ruled the issue was moot because
of the decision that the belugas were not endangered. ACE appealed the decision to the Alaska
Supreme Court.
Alaska’s Endangered Species Act
Alaska’s Endangered Species Act is similar to the federal Endangered Species Act. The Commissioner of
Fish and Game is authorized to list a species or subspecies as “endangered.” An endangered species or
subspecies is one whose “numbers have decreased to
such an extent as to indicate that its continued existence is threatened.”3 The commissioner is to consider the following indicators in making a decision:
(1) the destruction, drastic modification, or
severe curtailment of its habitat;
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(2) its overutilization for commercial or sporting
purposes;
(3) the effect on it of disease or predation;
(4) other natural or man-made factors affecting
its continued existence.4
Also, the commissioner is to seek “the advice and recommendation of interested persons and organizations, including but not limited to ornithologists,
ichthyologists, ecologists, and zoologists.”5 Species or
subspecies listed as endangered “may not be harvested, captured, or propagated except under the terms of
special permit issued by the commissioner.”6
Listing Decision
The court must “accept the commissioner’s decision
unless it lacks any rational basis.”7 ACE argued that
the commissioner’s failure to list the Cook Inlet belugas as endangered was arbitrary and without rational basis because the commissioner failed to consider the small size of the beluga population and the
current threats to the population. The court dismissed ACE’s claims.
The commissioner, considering all the factors,
determined that overharvesting was the likely cause
of the beluga’s decline. Since federal law gives exclusive authority to NMFS to manage overharvesting of
whales, the commissioner concluded that only the
federal government could control overharvesting and
that rules already adopted by NMFS would likely
succeed. The court concluded that the commissioner’s decision was rational.
Are the Whales a Subspecies?
The commissioner concluded that the Cook Inlet beluga whales did not qualify as a “species or subspecies” within the meaning of the law. ACE argued
that the commissioner misconstrued the meaning of
“species or subspecies” and that the commissioner’s
interpretation of the Act was unduly narrow. The
commissioner argued this point was moot.
Typically, a court will not consider a moot issue
“when its resolution would not result in any actual
relief, even if the claiming party prevailed.”8 However,
if public interest would be served by deciding the
moot issue, a court may consider it. To address a moot
issue under the public interest exception, a court
must find (1) that the issue in question is capable of
repetition, (2) that it might repeatedly evade review if
the mootness doctrine is strictly applied, and (3) that
it “is so important to the public interest as to justify
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

overriding the mootness doctrine.”9 The court decided the commissioner’s decision met the three-part
test for review because the “subspecies” issue will
continually come up in future law suits, may evade
review if courts continue to find the commissioner
has made a rational decision, and is of important
public interest because a ruling now could result in a
quicker response if the whales become endangered.
The commissioner ruled that the whales are not a
subspecies because the scientific literature does not
recognize the Cook Inlet beluga whales as a distinct
subspecies of the general beluga species. The commissioner argued that, in his view, the act used
“species” and “subspecies” in the technical taxonomic sense. The court disagreed with this narrow reading. The court ruled that the act requires the commissioner to take a hard look at all views from informed
scientists in determining the existence of a subspecies, not just taxonomy. Because the commissioner
only considered taxonomy, the court held that he
abused his discretion. The court, however, refrained
from expressing a view on whether the Cook Inlet
beluga whales would be considered a subspecies
under this broader definition.
Conclusion
Even though environmental groups were unsuccessful in getting the Cook Inlet belugas listed as an
endangered species, this ruling could be seen as a
small victory. Requiring the commissioner to use a
broad definition may make it easier in the future for
environmental groups to argue that the Cook Inlet
belugas are a “subspecies.” This is one fewer battle
that the environmental groups will have to fight if the
beluga’s numbers continue to decline.

Endnotes
1. Danny is a second-year law student at University of
Mississippi School of Law.
2. An “endangered species” is one that “is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion
of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2004).
3. Alaska Stat. § 16.20.190(a) (2004).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 16.20.190(c).
6. Id. § 16.20.195.
7. Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. Rue, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 98 at
*14 (Alaska July 30, 2004).
8. Id. at *18.
9. Id. at *19.
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A Right to a Salvage Award, Not Title
R.M.S. Titanic v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel et
al., 323 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Shannon McGhee1
On July 2, 2004, the Eastern District Court of Virginia
held that it would not recognize a 1993 “ProcesVerbal” issued by a French maritime official that purportedly granted R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. (RMST) title to
1,800 artifacts salvaged from the Titanic in 1987.
RMST would also be estopped from claiming title to
5,900 Titanic artifacts under the law of finds at its
October 18, 2004 salvage award hearing.

give effect to the court’s judgment and should not
evaluate its merits.”6 The court pointed out, however,
that the Proces-Verbal was not carried out in a full
and fair proceeding because the Administrator failed
to make any factual findings regarding the value of
the artifacts, TVLP’s cost of salvage service, the artifacts’ importance, or a proposed monetary salvage
award for TVLP’s approval as required by French law
at the time the agreement was executed.
Specifically, the court found the whole ProcesVerbal proceeding suspicious after the Administrator
cited a French provision which allowed him to “remit
to the salvor (“TVLP”), as his property, all salvage of
little value which would produce no appreciable
amount at sale.”7 The salvaged property referred to by
the Administrator was the first 1,800 artifacts ever
collected from the Titanic wreck. The court refused to
accept that the Administrator found the first ever salvaged Titanic artifacts valueless, especially when
RMST itself estimates all 1,800 artifacts as worth
$16,687,316.8
Additionally, the court held even if the ProcesVerbal was legitimate, recognizing it would be contrary to U.S. public policy. The United States’ public
policy of keeping all Titanic artifacts together was
adequately expressed, the court reasoned, in 2001

Background
Since 1987, RMST has salvaged 5,900 Titanic artifacts. 1,800 of these artifacts were salvaged prior to
RMST being awarded the exclusive right to recover
artifacts from the Titanic wreck in 1994 as salvor-inpossession. Eight months before the U.S. District
Court granted RMST exclusive salvor-in-possession
status, a French Maritime Affairs Administrator, M.
Chapalain, on behalf of the Headquarter of Lorient
executed a “Proces-Verbal”2 which transferred title of
the 1,800 artifacts salvaged in 1987 to RMST’s predecessor-in-interest, Titanic Ventures limited partnership (TVLP).3 In 2004, RMST filed
Photograph of Titanic courtesy of NOAA’s Ocean Explorer
a “Motion for Salvage and/or
Finds Award” to collect on the salvage liens it had acquired from the
Titanic artifacts recovered. In the
alternative, RMST asked the court
to recognize RMST’s title to all
5,900 artifacts under the 1993
“Proces-Verbal” and the “law of
finds.”4
The 1993 Proces-Verbal
In applying principles of international comity,5 the court declined
to recognize the 1993 ProcesVe r b a l . T h e c o u r t e x p l a i n e d
“where a foreign court renders a
judgment following what appears
to have been a fair trial with the
participation of all interested parties, an American court should
Page 18

Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

when the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), in implementing the
Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, produced
guidelines for the research, exploration, and salvage
of the Titanic wreck, stating “all artifacts recovered
from R.M.S. Titanic should be . . . kept together and
intact as project collections.”9 Awarding RMST title
to 1,800 of the 5,900 Titanic artifacts, the court concluded, would surely result in their dispersal.
Finders Keepers
After holding the status as exclusive salvor-in-possession of the Titanic wreck for ten years, RMST
asked the court to convert its salvage case into a
finds case. Such a change would allow RMST to gain
title over all 5,900 Titanic artifacts already in its
possession. Under the common law of finds, a salvor
must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1)
the abandonment of property, (2) possession of the
property and (3) intent to reduce that property to
ownership, before he or she can be awarded title to
the property.10 In contrast, under the law of salvage,
a salvor does not gain title over property found but
instead receives a salvage lien against the property
to ensure a reasonable reward for his or her salvage
services.
The court rationalized it would be inequitable
and inconsistent under the doctrine of judicial estoppel for RMST to claim title to the 5,900 artifacts
already collected while simultaneously retaining the
exclusive right to recover the remaining artifacts in
and surrounding the Titanic wreck. Because the court
was persuaded for the last ten years by RMST’s
repeated assertions that it would recover and preserve
Titanic artifacts (in part for the public’s benefit since
RMST believed the public had partial ownership of
the Titanic artifacts because of their historical and
cultural importance), they therefore lacked the intent
to acquire complete ownership as required under the
law of finds. Furthermore, under the law of finds a
court has no authority to stop other would-be salvors
from recovering abandoned property, which it does
have under the law of salvage. Thus, awarding RMST
title to the artifacts under finds law at this point
would give RMST a significant unfair advantage over
the entire world or, in other words, a ten-year commercial head start.
Conclusion
For the reasons cited above, the court ruled it would
not recognize the 1993 Proces-Verbal under principles
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

of international comity, and would not allow evidence
or argument at the October 18, 2004 hearing for the
purpose of awarding RMST title to the Titanic artifacts under the law of finds. Moreover, the October
18, 2004 hearing will determine an appropriate salvage award for all 5,900 Titanic artifacts in RMST’s
current possession based on (1) the market value, (2)
expert testimony and evidence of co-venturers’ contributions and RMST’s past remunerations received
for the display of Titanic artifacts, and (3) RMST’s
portion of the total salvage award, based on the evidence presented.
On August 2, 2004, the district court granted
RMST a stay and continuance of the October 18,
2004 proceeding until the Fourth Circuit determines whether it has jurisdiction to hear RMST’s
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s July 2,
2004 decision.11

Endnotes
1. Shannon is a third-year law student at the
University of Georgia School of Law.
2. A ‘proces-verbal,’ according to RMST, is “most
accurately described as a detailed and authenticated account drawn up by a magistrate, police
officer, or other person having authority of acts or
proceedings done in the exercise of his duty.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) defines
‘proces verbal’ as an “official record of oral proceedings.”
3. R.M.S. Titanic v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel
et al., 323 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727 (E.D. Va. 2004).
4. Id. at 730.
5. Comity “is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164
(1895).
6. R.M.S. Titanic, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
7. Id. at 732.
8. Id. at 733.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 735.
11. R.M.S. Titanic v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel
et al., 2004 WL 1745922 (E.D. Va.).
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Federal Circuit
Reverses $37 Million
Award to Fishing
Vessel
American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 379 F.3d 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
Lance M. Young1
In 2003, the Court of Federal Claims awarded the
owner of a fishing vessel, the Atlantic Star, over $37
million because, it reasoned, two appropriation acts
amounted to a temporary regulatory taking. 2 The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently vacated
that award.
Background
Throughout the 1990’s, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) reported that mackerel and herring
fish stocks were very high and underfished. The U.S.
Senate Finance Committee subsequently recommended the use of larger ships to fish large stocks of
mackerel and herring to compete with European fish
markets. Lisa Torgersen, the president of American
Pelagic Fishing Company, built the Atlantic Star vessel in response to these events. The Atlantic Star is
369 feet long and has a total of 13,400 horsepower. It
cost nearly $40 million to design and build with an
advanced freezing system, sorting system, and holding capacity of 400 to 500 metric tons of fish.
In 1997, Pelagic prepared for operation by obtaining the required permits and gear authorizations
from the Northeast Regional Office of the NMFS.
Simultaneously, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
C o m m i s s i o n a n d t h e N e w E n g l a n d Fi s h e r y
Management Council voiced opposition to the vessel’s operation. The opposition led to legislative proposals in the U.S. House and Senate that would ban
fishing vessels of this magnitude. While the legislation failed, Congress successfully revoked the permits and authorization of the Atlantic Star by attaching a rider to the 1997 appropriations act. The rider
prohibited funding of a fishing permit or authorization for any vessel greater than 165 feet in length,
more than 750 gross tons, or with a total horsepower
greater than 3,000. The 1998 appropriations act simiPage 20

Photograph of purse seining of herring courtesy of NOAA Fisheries Collection

larly prevented the vessel from obtaining permits and
the NMFS has since made it impossible to obtain
permits and authorization through its regulatory
scheme. The Atlantic Star was the only vessel affected
by the appropriations acts and regulation changes.
Pelagic then attempted to use the Atlantic Star
outside of U.S. designated waters. In the Baltic Sea, it
served as the “mother ship” for smaller fishing boats.
This voyage was not profitable. It also fished off the
coast of West Africa, the only other place it could
obtain fishing rights, but water conditions and low
fish stock resulted in lost profits.
In March of 1999, Pelagic sued the federal government claiming the two appropriation acts amounted to a regulatory taking. The Court of Federal
Claims held that the acts did result in a temporary
taking 3 and, in a separate damages trial, awarded
American Pelagic $37,275,952.67 based on the ship’s
hypothetical rental value.4
Takings Claim
T h e Fi f t h A m e n d m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
Constitution requires just compensation when private
property is taken for public use. The Fifth Amendment
taking clause applies to physical invasion of property
by the government or where “regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” 5
Furthermore, “a regulatory taking may occur when
government action, although not encroaching upon or
occupying private property, still affects and limits its
use to such an extent that a taking occurs.”6
If all economically beneficial use has not been
lost, courts use a balancing test, developed in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, to determine whether a property interest has been so affected
as to constitute a taking by government regulation.
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The court considers the economic harm suffered by
the claimant, the extent to which the government regulation has interfered with distinct investment
backed expectations, and the character of the government action.
A claimant such as Pelagic has to demonstrate
that a valid property right exists before it becomes
necessary for a court to determine whether a taking
has occurred. Traditionally, a metaphorical “bundle
or rights” has defined when a property right exists.
The bundle of rights includes the ability to possess,
consume, exclude, and transfer property. Pelagic
claimed it had a property right in the federal fishery
permits and authorizations given by NMFS. It
alleged a taking as a result of the 1997 and 1998
appropriation acts, which prohibited the Atlantic Star
from fishing after it had already secured the proper
authorizations to fish. Permits and licenses, as the
District Court acknowledged, are not property that
can be protected by the Fifth Amendment. The right
to transfer or sell is one of the “sticks” in the “bundle
of rights” and because a permit holder cannot transfer or sell a fishing permit, there is no property right
in the permit. Permits are often viewed as privileges
rather than rights.
However, the District Court did determine that a
property right existed in the vessel itself. The court
found the “stick in the bundle” to be the right to use
the vessel, “subject to regulation.” 7 Because the
NMFS regulations in 1997 and 1998 permitted the
use of the vessel, the court determined that Pelagic
had an inherent right to use its vessel in U.S. waters.
The court then conducted a Penn Central balancing
test and determined that the appropriation acts
thwarted Pelagic’s investment backed expectations,
left the Atlantic Star with no commercially viable use,
and that the government regulation was retroactive
and targeted only at American Pelagic.8
Appellate Court’s Analysis
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that American
Pelagic had no right to fish in U.S. waters. The court
began its analysis by asking if holding a permit to
fish for mackerel is a legally cognizable property
interest. First, it distinguished between real property
and personal property. The owner of personal property, in contrast to the owner of land, should expect
that government regulation can devalue his or her
property interest at any time. Furthermore, the court
stated that there is a distinction between the government disturbing the use of personal property and
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having a right to use the property. A takings analysis
should begin only if the right to use property has
been violated.
The 1976 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (now the Magnuson-Stevens Act) created the United States fishery conservation zone
out to 200 miles, in which the U.S. has management authority over fish. According to the court,
“sovereignty indisputably encompasses all rights
to fish.”9 However, the Magnuson-Stevens Act does
not give individual fishermen the right or title to
fish resources.
Because the court found that American Pelagic
had no property interest, Pelagic’s taking claim
failed. The government did disturb Pelagic’s use of
the Atlantic Star. The NMFS permits and authorizations did not, however, give Pelagic a right to fish in
U.S. waters. In other words, when Pelagic purchased
the Atlantic Star, its right to fish in U.S. waters was
not one of the sticks in the bundle of rights that were
inherent in the ownership of that vessel. For that reason, a taking claim could not prevail.
Conclusion
The District Court’s $37 million award was vacated.
The result of this dispute has an important implication for fishermen. The right to fish within U.S.
waters is held exclusively by the government; thus,
permits and authorizations grant privileges to individual fishermen to utilize the government’s
resources but do not transfer property rights for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Endnotes
1. Lance is a second-year law student at Roger
Williams School of Law in Bristol, Rhode Island.
2. For analysis of the Federal Court of Claims decision, see Stephanie Showalter, Vessel Owner Awarded
Over $37 Million for Temporary Taking, THE SANDBAR
2:2, 1 (2003).
3. American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 36
(Fed. Cl. 2001).
4. American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 55 Fed. Cl. 575
(Fed. Cl. 2003).
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1004 (1992).
6. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
7. American Pelagic Fishing Co., 49 Fed. Cl. at 48 (Fed.
Cl. 2001).
8. Id. at 48-51.
9. American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 379 F.3d 1363,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Book Review . . .
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.

The Privatization of the Oceans
Rögnvaldur Hannesson (MIT Press 2004)

How can governments prevent the tragedy of the
commons from playing out on a global scale in the
world’s oceans? The current fisheries management
regulatory regime based on open access has proven
ineffective at preventing the overcapacity of fleets
and the unsustainable harvest of fish stocks. New and
innovative management techniques are desperately
needed. Rögnvaldur Hannesson in The Privatization
of the Oceans presents a persuasive argument that
Individual Fish Quotas (IFQs) are the best management tool currently available. According to
Hannesson, “the role of property rights in fisheries in
no different from the role of property rights elsewhere in the economy: property rights, if adequately
defined and enforced, encourage efficient use of
resources in the present with appropriate regard for
the future.”
Mixing history with economic theory, Hannesson
examines the privatization of the oceans beginning
with extension of national jurisdiction to 200 miles in
the 1970s and concluding with the development of
IFQ systems in New Zealand, Chile, Norway,
Canada, Iceland, and the United States. While the
existing IFQ systems have not always resulted in the
recovery of the fish stocks they were designed to manage, most have increased the efficiency of the fisheries by reducing the size of the fleet and the amount
of capital invested. The case studies, especially the
failures, provide scholars, fisheries managers, and
policy makers with some valuable insights into the
necessary elements of an IFQ regime and potential
sources of conflict. The creation of an IFQ system
will affect some of sectors of the fishery more than
others and there will be perceived “losers.”
Hannesson’s case studies reveal that these “losers”
are different in every fishery and can be very powerful opponents. In New Zealand, the Maori argued
that the IFQ system violated their traditional fishing
rights protected by a treaty with Great Britain. In
Alaska, the crab processors worried about losing busiPage 22

ness to fresh fish markets as the season grew longer.
Valuable lessons can be learned from the various
approaches taken by each nation to address the real
and perceived losses of the different sectors.
It is important to note that Hannesson approaches IFQs from a purely economic perspective. Some
environmental groups, mainly in the United States,
have strongly opposed the development of IFQs.
Hannesson acknowledges their arguments, which are
generally based on the premise that marine life is
valuable in and of itself, and recognizes that “exclusive use rights have no role to play in that universe.”
IFQs, however, may hold the key to the ultimate conservation of the world’s fish stocks by giving fishermen a vested interest in their survival. The
Privatization of the Oceans is a fascinating look into
the early development of IFQs around the world and
a great starting point for anyone interested in learning more about the evolution of private property
rights in fisheries.
Rögnvaldur Hannesson is a Professor of Fisheries
Economics at the Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration and Research Director
at the Center for Fisheries Economics in Bergen,
Norway.
Volume 3, No. 3 The SandBar

Pierce County in Washington State is the first county to update its land use regulations as required by the
state’s Growth Management Act. The Act was passed in 1990 to address the negative impacts of population
growth and suburban sprawl. The county’s proposed changes would require developers to retain 30 percent of
Garry oaks and 10 percent of other significant trees and authorize the reduction of the average size of residential lots to preserve wildlife habitat and wetlands. The county had also proposed a 100-foot “no touch” marine buffer, but politics forced
the county to postpone the issue of marine buffers until 2006
when it will review its shoreline master plan. Until then, the
county will continue to apply site-specific standards to protect
sensitive shorelines.

Photograph of North Pacific shoreline, ©Nova Development
Corp.

NOAA and the EPA recently warned New Jersey that its new
“fast-track” environmental permitting law may threaten a portion of the state’s federal funding. The law, which takes effect
in November, is designed to provide a quicker review of state
environmental permit applications. Federal agencies could cut
funding or assume authority over the state’s permitting
process if the new law hinders the state’s ability to protect its
coastal environment. For example, mandatory deadlines can
lead to permit approvals by default if the state is unable to
meet the deadlines. New Jersey receives approximately $3 million from the federal government annually for coastal projects
and environmental permitting programs.

The Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History has embarked upon a $60 million restoration project culminating in 2008 with the opening of Ocean Hall, a 28,000 square-foot exhibit dedicated to the
oceans. Ocean Hall will contain a 50-foot-long model of a northern right whale, an immersion theater that
will allow visitors to experience diving into the deep, a captured giant squid, and a display highlighting the
coelacanth. The Museum also plans to feature cutting-edge research by Museum scientists through videos
and temporary exhibits.

Around the Globe
Chaos continued to reign in the Galapagos during September, but not at
the hands of fishermen this time. Following a fishermen strike in June
2004 and a contentious court battle over sea cucumber harvest limits, the
Ecuadorean government decided to remove Edwin Naula from his post
as director of Galapagos Island National Park. Naula, popular with environmentalists and the tourist industry, was replaced by Fausto Cepeda.
Over 300 park wardens went on strike to protest Cepeda’s appointment
and Cepeda was escorted across the picket line by fishermen armed with
clubs and machetes. The strike concluded on September 28 with the
announcement that the government had dismissed Cepeda as director.
So the search is on for a new director, the park’s ninth in two years.
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